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JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this matter 
pursuant to section 78-2-3(2)(a) of the Utah Code, giving it 
appellate jurisdiction over the final Orders and Decrees 
resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings of state agencies. 
This action is an appeal from an Order issued by the Utah 
Department of Health following a formal hearing. 
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARD FOR REVIEW 
ISSUES PRESENTED 
The following are at issue in this Appeal: 
1. Did the Utah Department of Health, Division of Health 
Care Financing erroneously apply the law in ruling that Shawnta 
Herrera was not a resident of the State of Utah between December 
7, 1991 and February 1, 1991? 
2. Did the Department of Health, Division of Health Care 
Financing, erroneously apply the law when it determined that 
Shawnta Herrera was not entitled to Medicaid benefits during the 
period stated above? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The standard of review in this proceeding is set forth in 
Section 63-46b-16(4) of the Utah Code. It provides: 
The appellate court should grant relief only if, on the 
basis of the agency's record, it determines that a person 
seeking judicial review has been substantially prejudiced by 
any of the following: 
3 
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(a) the agency action, or the statute or rule on which 
the agency action is based, is unconstitutional on its face 
or as applied; 
(b) the agency has acted beyond the jurisdiction 
conferred by any statute; 
(c) the agency has not decided all the issues requiring 
resolution; 
(d) the agency has erroneously interpreted or applied 
the law; 
(e) the agency has engaged in an unlawful procedure 
decision-making process or has failed to follow prescribed 
procedure; 
(f) the persons taking agency action were illegally 
constituted as a decision-making body or were subject to 
disqualification; 
(g) the agency action is based upon a determination of 
fact, made or implied by the agency, that is not supported 
by substantial evidence when viewed in light of the whole 
record before the court; 
(h) the agency action is: 
(i) an abuse of the discretion delegated to the 
agency by statute; 
(ii) contrary to the rule of the agency; 
(iii) contrary to the agency's prior practice, 
unless the agency justifies the inconsistency by giving 
facts and reasons that demonstrate a fair and rational 
basis for the inconsistency; or 
(iv) otherwise arbitrary or capricious. 
In addressing the issues presented, this court is not bound 
by the determination of the Department of Health. Addressing the 
statute just cited, particularly subpart (d), Utah appellate 
courts have held that "an agency's statutory construction should 
only be given deference when there is a grant of discretion to 
the agency concerning the language in question." Morton 
International, Inc. v. Auditing Division, 814 P.2d 581 (Utah 
1991); see also Mor-Flo Industries v. Board of Review, 817 P.2d 
328 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
This case involves the application of facts to the 
regulatory definition of resident. As such, it is a question of 
application of the law, suitable for the correction of error 
4 
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standard. Morton International, Inc., 814 P.2d at 586-89. 
Further, there is no grant of discretion to the agency regarding 
application of the term. As will be discussed below, federal law 
requires that certain benefits be available to all eligible 
residents of a state. The term "resident" has been defined in 
detail by the United States Department of Health and Human 
Services. See 42 C.F.R. § 435.403, thus removing any agency 
discretion. In fact, as states have attempted to alter or 
interpret residency in an alternative fashion, the Department of 
Health and Human Services has amended the rule to clarify its 
intent and meaning. See, e.g., 49 Fed. Reg. 1352 6-31. Hence, 
the Department of Health is not entitled to discretion in its 
application. 
Neither does the decision of the Department of Health 
deserve deference because of its expertise. Courts have always 
been empowered to address residency laws, putting this court in 
just as good a position as the agency to make the determination. 
Thus, in applying the findings of fact in this matter to the 
law, the court is entitled to apply a correction of error 
standard and ignore the decision of the Department of Health. It 
may "decide that the agency has erroneously interpreted the law 
if the court merely disagrees with the agency's interpretation." 
Morton, 814 P.2d at 587 (quoting Savage Industries, Inc. v. Utah 
State Tax Comm'n, 811 P.2d 664, 670 (Utah 1991). 
5 
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CONTROLLING LAW 
Rule R414-1-17 of the Utah Administrative Code provides: 
Medicaid is furnished to eligible individuals who are 
residents of the State under 42 C.F.R. § 435.403. (The 
addendum includes 42 C.F.R. § 435.403 in its entirety.) 
Section 435.403(m) of 42 C.F.R. provides: 
Cases of disputed residency. Where two or more States 
cannot resolve which State is the State of residence, the 
State where the individual is physically located is the 
State of residence. 
Section 233.40 of 45 C.F.R. provides: 
(a) Condition for Plan Approval. A State plan under title 
I, IV-A, X, XIV, or XVI of the Social Security Act may not 
impose any residence requirement which excludes any 
individual who is a resident of the State except as provided 
in paragraph (b) of this section. For purposes of this 
section: 
(1) A resident of a State is one: (i) Who is living in 
the State voluntarily with the intention of making his or 
her home there and not for a temporary purpose. A child is 
the resident of the State in which he or she is living other 
than on a temporary basis. Residence may not depend upon 
the reason for which the individual entered the State, 
except insofar as it may bear upon whether the individual is 
there voluntarily or for a temporary purpose; or 
(ii) Who, in living in the State, is not receiving 
assistance from another State, and entered the State with a 
job commitment or seeking employment in the State (whether 
or not currently employed). Under this definition, the 
child is a resident of the State in which the caretaker is a 
resident. 
(2) Residence is retained until abandoned. Temporary 
absence from the State, with subsequent returns to the 
State, or intent to return when the purposes of the absence 
have been accomplished, does not interrupt continuity of 
residence. 
(b) Exception. A State plan under title I, X, XIV or XVI 
need not include an individual who has been absent from the 
State for a period in excess of 90 consecutive days 
(regardless of whether the individual has maintained his or 
her residence in the State during this period) until he or 
6 
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she has been present in the State for a period of 3 0 
consecutive days (or a shorter period specified by the 
State) in the case of such individual who has maintained 
residence in the State during such period of absence or for 
a period of 90 consecutive days (or a shorter period as 
specified by the State) in the case of any other such 
individual. An individual thus excluded under any such plan 
may not, as a consequence of that exclusion, be excluded 
from assistance under the State's Title XIX plan if 
otherwise eligible under the Title XIX Plan (see 42 C.F.R. § 
436.403), 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from an Order of the Utah Department of 
Health, Division of Health Care Financing which denied Medicaid 
benefits to an infant. The infant was born in December 199 0 in 
Murray, Utah and was hospitalized from that date through April 
1991. Although the Department of Health paid Medicaid benefits 
for the infant between February and April 1991, it denied 
benefits for the months of December 1990 and January 1991 on the 
grounds that the infant was not a resident of the state of Utah 
but of Arizona. The Arizona Physicians IPA, Inc., Arizonafs 
Medicaid administrator, also refused to pay benefits during this 
period, which decision was affirmed by the Arizona Health Care 
Cost Containment System following a hearing (Appellate Record at 
Exhibits, hereinafter "R. at " ) . 
Primary Children's Medical Center, who provided medical care 
to the infant, requested, on her behalf, a hearing addressing the 
denied benefits before the Utah Department of Health (R. at 1-2). 
That resulted in an Order from the Department of Health ruling 
that the infant was ineligible for Medicaid because she was not 
7 
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a resident of Utah (R. at 69-77). The Order was affirmed in 
Response to a Request for Reconsideration (R. at 83-91). 
Following that ruling, this appeal was filed (R. at 92-93). 
STATEMENT OP FACTS 
In October 1990, Norma Molina came to Utah from Arizona. 
She owned no property in Arizona, nor did she leave an apartment 
in her own name. Upon her arrival in Utah, she stayed with 
friends and family. (Agency Findings of Fact, R. at 72-73). 
On December 6, 1990, Norma Molina gave birth to a baby girl, 
Shawnta Herrera, at Cottonwood Hospital Medical Center in Murray, 
Utah. (Agency Findings of Fact, R. at 72-73). Because Shawnta 
was born prematurely, she was transferred to Primary Children's 
Hospital the next day, where she remained hospitalized until 
April 1991. (Agency Findings of Fact, R. at 72-73) . 
Ms. Molina resided continuously in Utah after October 1990 
(Agency Findings of Fact, R. at 72-73). She applied for prenatal 
benefits in that month, and was deemed eligible for such benefits 
through Shawnta's birth. (R. at Exhibits). She applied for 
Medicaid assistance in December 1990 and again in March 1991, 
(Response to Request for Reconsideration, R. at 83-91). When 
making those applications, she expressed her intent to make her 
home in Utah. (Request for Reconsideration, R. at 80). 
Between January 9, 1991 and March 8, 1991, Ms. Molina was 
employed by Northwest Textiles in Midvale, Utah. (Agency 
8 
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Findings of Fact, R. at 72-73; Letter from Anna Navarrate, R. at 
Exhibits). 
According to the notes of representatives of the Department 
of Health, during the months of December 1990 and January 1991, 
Ms. Molina, despite her residency in Utah, did not surrender her 
rights to certain benefits from Arizona, nor did she notify 
Arizona authorities of her Utah residence (Response to Request 
for Reconsideration, Exhibits, R. at 83-91) . She allegedly 
received AFDC support in these months, although it is unclear how 
it was delivered to her. (Response to Request for 
Reconsideration, Exhibits, R. at 83-91; Transcript of Hearing, R. 
at 29). When Ms. Molina spoke with representatives of Primary 
Children's Medical Center in December 1990, however, she stated 
that she had no means of paying for medical services rendered. 
(Transcript of Hearing, R. at 30-31). Arizona closed its file on 
Ms. Molina on January 31, 1991. (Response to Request for 
Reconsideration, Exhibits, R. at 83-91). 
After learning that Norma Molina was living in Utah, APIPA, 
the Arizona Medicaid administrator, refused to pay Shawnta's 
medical expenses for December 1990 and January 1991. (R. at 
Exhibits). In justifying denial of the claim, the Director of 
the Arizona Health Care Cost Containment System stated that (1) 
APIPA was not properly notified of the care at Primary Children's 
Medical Center, and (2) "testimony and the records support the 
contention that the patient was not a resident of the state of 
Arizona." (Decision, R. at Exhibits). He ordered a reevaluation 
•9 
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of Ms. Molina's eligibility for AFDC and Medicaid benefits, (R. 
at Exhibits), and since that time, Arizona authorities have 
refused to pay any of Shawnta's medical expenses for this period. 
(Letter from Leonard J. Kirschner, R. at 82). 
In March 1991, the Utah Department of Health, Division of 
Health Care Financing approved Ms. Molina's application for 
Medicaid benefits retroactive to February 1, 1991. (Agency 
Findings of Fact, R. at 72-73). Shawnta Herrera's medical 
expenses incurred at Primary Children's Medical Center from that 
date forward were paid by the Department of Health, Division of 
Health Care Financing (Transcript of Hearing, R. at 61). The 
expenses for December 1990 and January 1991 have not been paid, 
despite the residency of Ms. Molina and Shawnta in Utah 
(Transcript of Hearing, R. at 38). 
Shawnta Herrera moved to Arizona with her mother in June 
1991. (Transcript of Hearing, R. at 47). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
At its essence, this claim involves a disagreement between 
Utah and Arizona as to who should provide Medicaid benefits for 
an infant, the petitioner Shawnta Herrera. The Utah Department 
of Health takes the position that Shawnta and her mother were not 
residents of Utah, citing a future intent to return to the 
mother's previous state of residence, Arizona. Arizona 
authorities, on the other hand, claim that the mother's extended 
presence in Utah, without leaving a home in Arizona, make Shawnta 
10 
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a resident of Utah. In the middle of this dispute, the infant, 
her mother and health care providers are left with significant 
medical expenses. 
In outlining the regulatory framework for Medicaid, federal 
authorities anticipated such disputes. For this reason, they 
adopted a regulation to govern them. In the case of a dispute, 
residency is determined according to physical presence. Because 
Shawnta was physically in the State of Utah, she is deemed a Utah 
resident for Medicaid purposes. Hence, she is entitled to any 
benefits from Utah for which she is eligible. 
Furthermore, Shawnta was in fact a resident of Utah. 
Federal Regulations governing Medicaid benefits define residence 
according to physical presence other than on a temporary basis. 
Viewed in light of existing legal authority concerning residency, 
this signifies presence in a locale coupled with an intent to 
remain there for an indefinite time. 
When Norma Molina came to Utah, she intended to remain for 
an indefinite time. She left no home or apartment in Arizona, 
and although she intended to return at some time, the date of and 
place for that return was uncertain. One and one-half months 
after arriving in Utah, she gave birth to Shawnta Herrera, who 
was hospitalized for the first four and one-half months of her 
life. Although Ms. Molina might have returned to Arizona for a 
time during these months, she did not. Even after Shawntafs 
discharge from the Hospital, Ms. Molina continued to reside in 
Utah, staying through June 1991. 
11 
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While in Utah, Norma Molina took a job, applied for medical 
and welfare benefits, and otherwise made Utah the center of her 
life. In so doing, on at least one occasion she expressed her 
specific intent to make her home in Utah. Although she 
maintained some future intent to return to Arizona, during the 
period at dispute herein, her intent was to remain in Utah for an 
indefinite period. As such, she was a resident of Utah and her 
daughter is entitled to Medicaid benefits. 
ARGUMENT 
This Appeal involves a dispute as to residency. Following 
her premature birth in Murray, Utah on December 6, 1990, Shawnta 
Herrera was hospitalized for the first four and one-half months 
of her life. Despite her apparent eligibility for Medicaid 
benefits, which were paid for February, March and April of 1991, 
The Utah Department of Health, Division of Health Care Financing 
("Department of Health"), denied those benefits for December 1990 
and January 1991 on the grounds that Shawnta was not a resident 
of Utah. Arizona, the site designated by the Department of 
Health as Shawntafs State of Residence during those months, did 
the same. As a consequence, the medical expenses incurred by 
Shawnta at Primary Childrenfs Medical Center remain unpaid. For 
this reason, Shawnta appeals the denial of those benefits by the 
Department of Health. 
12 
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I. BECAUSE UTAH AND ARIZONA CANNOT RESOLVE THE DISPUTE AS TO 
HER RESIDENCY, SHAWNTA HERRERA MUST BE CONSIDERED A RESIDENT 
OP THE STATE OP UTAH. 
A. Federal Law Requires States to Provide Medicaid Benefits to 
All Eligible Residents and Allows Every Individual to Have a 
Residence for the Purpose of Such Benefits, 
To obtain federal assistance for its Medicaid program, the 
Department of Health had to adopt a plan meeting statutory and 
regulatory requirements, as well as receiving the approval of the 
United States Department of Health and Human Services ("HHS"). 
See generally 42 U.S.C. § 1396a et seq. Among the requirements 
is the condition that a "plan may not contain any residence 
requirement which excludes any individual who resides in the 
state," even if that person has no fixed address. 42 U.S.C. § 
1396a(b). Thus, the Medicaid plan for Utah cannot be interpreted 
to deny benefits to an otherwise eligible resident of the state. 
To determine who is a resident to in order to qualify for 
Medicaid benefits, the Utah plan incorporates the regulations 
promulgated by HHS. Utah Admin. Code R414-1-17 (1992) 
(incorporating 42 C.F.R. § 435.403). As HHS has amended these 
regulations since their inception, it has made clear its intent 
to allow every eligible1 individual access to Medicaid benefits. 
Thus, HHS supported certain changes by stating that the purpose 
of the rule is: 
to permit uniform application and to insure that no 
otherwise eligible individual is denied Medicaid because no 
1
 Eligibility, in this context, refers not to residency but 
to factors relating to income and disability which determine who 
is entitled to Medicaid benefits. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 
1396a. 
13 
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state recognizes him as a resident .... We want to insure 
that no individual finds himself without any state of 
residence for Medicaid purposes or is denied his 
Constitutional rights to travel freely among states. 
Summary, Supplementary Information, 44 Fed. Reg. 41434 (1979); 
see also Supplementary Information, 49 Fed. Reg. 13527 (1984). 
Given this language, there can be no question that Shawnta 
Herrera is entitled to residency in some state for the purpose of 
obtaining Medicaid benefits. 
The regulatory section governing residence, 42 C.F.R. § 
435.403, provides numerous rules to determine the residency of 
persons in distinct situations. Shawnta!s residency, for 
instance, is determined according to a separate regulation 
governing residence under AFDC programs. 42 C.F.R. § 
435.403(h)(3). It provides that "A child is a resident of the 
state in which he or she is living other than on a temporary 
basis." 45 C.F.R. § 233.40(j)(1). Other sections clarify the 
state of residence where a person might be considered a resident 
of either of two states. See 42 C.F.R. § 435.403(h)(4) 
(residence of institutionalized minors). Of particular 
importance for this case is the rule dealing with disputed 
residency, a "tie breaker" provision. It provides: "Where two or 
more states cannot resolve which State is the State of residence, 
the state where the individual is physically located is the state 
of residence." 42 C.F.R. § 435.403(m). Thus, when states are 
unable to resolve the question of residency, physical presence 
becomes the determining factor. 
14 
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B. As Utah and Arizona Cannot Resolve Shawnta Herrera's 
Residence During December 1990 and January 1991, She was a 
Resident of Utah, the State where She was Physically 
Present. 
In this case, both Arizona and Utah have refused to provide 
Medicaid payments for December 1990 and January 1991. Although 
the Department of Health paid benefits between February and April 
1991, it denied those benefits for December 1990 and January 1991 
on the grounds that Shawnta was not a resident of Utah, but of 
Arizona. Similarly, Arizona refused to pay medicaid such 
benefits for this period, in part because "the patient was not a 
resident of the state of Arizona at the time services were 
provided." Challenges to the denial of benefits in each state 
were unsuccessful and negotiations between the states upon 
Request for Reconsideration in Utah proved fruitless. When 
Arizona refused to pay, Utah did the same. 
Hence, this matter obviously involves a dispute in which 
"two or more states cannot resolve which State is the State of 
residence." As such, "the State where the individual is 
physically located is the State of Residence." Without dispute, 
Shawnta Herrera and her mother were physically present in Utah 
during December 1990 and January 1991. Therefore, Utah is the 
State of Residence. Shawnta is entitled to medicaid benefits in 
Utah for those months. 
15 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
II. SHAWNTA HERRERA WAS A IN FACT A RESIDENT OF UTAH IN DECEMBER 
1990 AND JANUARY 1991, AND THEREFORE ENTITLED TO MEDICAID 
BENEFITS DURING THAT TIME. 
As noted above, Shawnta Herrera should be considered a 
resident of Utah during December 1990 and January 1991 based on 
the dispute between Utah and Arizona and her physical presence in 
Utah. Aside from that determination, however, Shawnta also 
qualified as a resident of Utah under the provision defining 
residency for children. That states: "A child is a resident of 
the state in which he or she is living other than on a temporary 
basis.11 45 C.F.R. § 233 .40 (j) (1) . Because Shawnta was in Utah 
for an indefinite period, not on a temporary basis, she was a 
resident of the state. 
A. A Resident Intends to Remain in a State For a Time or 
Indefinitely. 
Courts have not addressed the regulatory provision governing 
Shawnta's residency. Interpretation of that provision, however, 
is aided by reference to judicial decisions relating to residency 
or domicile.2 See Application of Ruiz v. Lavine, 49 A.D.2d 1, 
Residency is a term subject to numerous interpretations, 
see Ortman v. Miller, 33 Mich.App. 451, 190 N.W.2d 242, 244 
(1971)(discussing various interpretations). In most cases 
involving determination of residency for purposes of legal rights 
and privileges, however, residency is deemed the equivalent of 
the common law doctrine of domicile. See, e.g., Utah Code Ann. § 
53B-8-102(l) (1992); Paulson v. Forest City Community School 
Dist., 238 N.W.2d 344 (Iowa 1976). 
Such is the case here, given the governing regulation's 
reference to physical presence "other than on a temporary basis." 
The cases addressing domicile, however, substitute "intent to 
remain for an indefinite time" for the regulatory language. 
Allen v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 583 P.2d 613 (Utah 1978). 
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370 N.Y.S.2d 710 (1975)(using rules of common law domicile to 
determine whether individual qualified for Medicaid). 
Justice Holmes defined domicile as "the technically 
preeminent headquarters that every person is compelled to have in 
order that certain rights and duties that have been attached to 
it by the law may be determined." Williamson v. Osenton, 232 
U.S. 619, 625 (1914). Every person must have a domicile, See 
Frame v. Residency Appeals Committee, 675 P.2d 1157, 1168 (Utah 
1983)(Howe, J. dissenting), which is usually a person's home, 
"where a person dwells and which is the center of his domestic, 
social and civil life." Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws 
§§ 11-12. Where an individual resides is presumed to be her 
domicile. See District of Columbia v. Murphy, 314 U.S. 441, 455 
(1941). 
Along with physical presence, the critical element in 
determining an individual's residence or domicile is intent. The 
Restatement states: "To acquire a domicil ... a person must 
intend to make that place his home for a time at least." 
Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 18; Frame, 675 P.2d at 
1168 (Howe, J. dissenting); Hawes v. Club Ecuestre El Comandante, 
598 F.2d 698 (1st Cir. 1979). Courts addressing the same concept 
have emphasized that the individual must intend to remain for an 
"indefinite" time, Allen, 583 P.2d at 615, Lloyd v. Babb, 296 
N.C. 416, 251 S.E.2d 843 (1979), looking specifically at whether 
an individual has a present intention to reside elsewhere. 
Williamson v. Osenton, 232 U.S. 619 (1914). In this case, 
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therefore, the key is whether Shawnta and her mother intended to 
reside in Utah for an indefinite time. 
B. Shawnta Herrera was a Resident of Utah Because She Intended 
to Remain for an Indefinite Time. 
In this case, the expressions and actions of Shawnta's 
mother demonstrate that Shawnta was not in Utah for a temporary 
purpose, but that she was living in Utah indefinitely.3 Norma 
Molina came to Utah from Arizona in October 1990. Although she 
stayed with friends and family, obtaining no home or apartment of 
her own, she neither left real estate or an apartment in her name 
in Arizona. Shortly after arrival, she applied for prenatal 
benefits through the Department of Health, for which she was 
classified as eligible. 
After Norma Molina had been in Utah for a month and a half, 
longer than a typical vacation or visit, she delivered Shawnta. 
As was noted above, Shawnta was hospitalized until she was four 
and one-half months old. During this time, Ms. Molina was free 
to return to Arizona. Instead, however, she remained in Utah, 
taking employment with a Utah firm4 and working during several 
3The domicile of a child is that of its parent, Oleen v. 
Oleen, 15 Utah 2d 326, 392 P.2d 792, 794 (1964), and the domicile 
a child born out of wedlock, as was Shawnta, is that if its 
mother, Application of Morse, 1 Utah 2d 312, 324 P.2d 773 (1958). 
Thus, the determination of whether Shawnta was in Utah for a 
temporary purpose hinges on her mother's intent. 
According to the Assistance Payment Administration Manual 
III-F, used by the Department of Health to determine residency, 
Utah residency can be demonstrated by verification of employment 
in the state. See APA, Volume IIIF, Table VIII, Examples of 
Acceptable Verifications, included in addendum. Further, persons 
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months that Shawnta was hospitalized. She also made application 
for Utah Medicaid benefits, both in December 1990 and again in 
March 1991. On those applications, she expressed her intent to 
make Utah her home. 
In the hearing on this matter, the Department of Health 
emphasized that Norma Molina intended to return to Arizona. Such 
intent, however, is not inconsistent with Utah residency. Utah 
courts have held that "A floating intention to return to a former 
abode is not sufficient to prevent the new abode from becoming 
one's domicile.11 Gardner v. Gardner, 118 Utah 496, 222 P.2d 
1055, 1057 (1950). Thus, contemplation of retirement in a 
location other than one's principal residence has not prevented 
the establishment of domicile, Perito v. Perito, 756 P.2d 895 
(Alaska 1988), and college students have been allowed to acquire 
domicile at the college, despite the fact that they intend to 
move elsewhere following graduation. Lloyd, 251 S.E.2d at 861-
65; Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Craddock, 26 Md.App. 296, 338 A.2d 
363 (1975). In this case, while Norma Molina intended to return 
to Arizona, she knew neither when nor where she would return. 
Thus, her present intent, demonstrated by her actions, was to 
remain. The "future" or "floating" intent would not prevent her 
from claiming Utah residency. 
"who are employed in another state are usually not Utah residents 
unless they commute regularly." APA, Volume IIIF, Glossary, 
"Resident". Using this definition, Norma Molina could not be a 
resident of any other state based upon her employment in Utah 
between January and March 1991. 
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Further, the fact that Norma Molina was in Utah for only 
eight months does not prevent her from claiming Utah residence. 
If the requisite intent is present, domicile can be acquired 
instantly, Krasnov v. Dinan, 465 F.2d 1298 (3rd Cir. 1972), For 
instance, in Person v. Person, 563 N.E.2d 161 (Ind. Ct. App. 
1990), a woman who had apparently reestablished her domicile in 
Indiana, her childhood home, who returned to her marital home in 
Illinois to attempt a reconciliation with her estranged husband, 
but stayed only for a week, acquired an Illinois residency during 
that time. Id. at 164. In this case, Shawnta acquired Utah 
residency upon arrival, in that she immediately made Utah the 
center of her life's activity. 
In summary, Norma Molina came to Utah with the intent of 
making it her home for a time. Upon arrival, she made it the 
center of her activity, which continued for eight months. While 
she considered returning to Arizona, that was not her present 
intention, reflected further in the fact that she remained in 
Utah more than a month after Shawnta's release from the hospital. 
Given such facts, Shawnta and her mother were residents of Utah, 
entitled to the benefits of such residency. This includes 
entitlement to Medicaid benefits for December 1990 and January 
1991. 
In arguing against this conclusion, the Department of Health 
argued that Norma Molina remained eligible for and received AFDC 
benefits from Arizona during December 1990 and January 1991. 
Although it is unclear whether she actually received benefits, 
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1 
and such action would admittedly be inconsistent with Utah 
residency, such conduct would be understandable in light of Ms. 
Molina's situation and the behavior of each state agency. 
With respect to the agencies, although Arizona allegedly 
provided AFDC benefits in December and January, it denied 
Medicaid payments. While that denial was based in part on 
procedural defects in the claim, after a hearing on the matter, 
the Director of Arizona's Cost Containment System also determined 
that Shawnta was not a resident of Arizona during those months 
and that Ms. Molina's eligibility should be reevaluated. Arizona 
has persisted in its refusal to pay those benefits. 
In contrast, the Department of Health paid no benefits for 
December and January, but did pay Medicaid and AFDC benefits to 
Ms. Molina between February and June of 199l.5 Following a 
hearing, however, the Department determined that those benefits 
5The Department of Health paid Medicaid benefits on 
Shawnta's behalf for the months of February, March and April 
1990, but denied the same for December 1990 and January 1991. At 
the hearing of this matter, representatives of the Department of 
Health justified the distinction by explaining that Ms. Molina 
considered herself a resident of Arizona during December 1990 and 
January 1991, but not thereafter (R. at 33). While the 
Department based its distinction on residency, it resembles a 
waiting period. Waiting periods for new residents to obtain 
Medicaid benefits have been deemed unconstitutional, since they 
violate equal protection because of their potential effect on 
interstate travel. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1968). 
Recognizing this problem, the Utah hearing officer 
recommended that Shawnta be deemed a resident of Utah from 
December forward, noting that there was no significance to 
February 1, 1991 (R. at 74-71). The Director also refused to 
accord significance to that date, but instead held that Shawnta 
was not eligible for benefits at any time, and that an 
overpayment should be requested (R. at 69-77). 
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were improperly paid because Ms, Molina was not a resident of 
Utah. 
In these circumstances, with both agencies paying benefits 
which they later described as improperly paid, Norma Molina 
cannot be faulted for accepting benefits from either state. She 
was on public support in Arizona and applied for the same in 
Utah, suggesting dependency. She was most likely without 
sufficient understanding of the system to know of her 
inconsistencies, and would reasonably have accepted a check 
without asking questions or considering the legal ramifications 
of acceptance. Further, this is in no way a case where duplicate 
benefits were sought, and this appeal is made only to obtain 
benefits for medical care already provided to Shawnta Herrera. 
Hence, the residency of Shawnta Herrera and her mother should not 
revolve on benefits she may have accepted from Arizona in the 
months in question. 
Thus, based on their intent to remain in Utah for an 
indefinite time. Shawnta Herrera and her mother should be 
considered residents of Utah. 
CONCLUSION 
At the root of this appeal is the unwillingness of both 
Arizona and Utah to provide Medicaid benefits to an infant. The 
states, thereby, seek to transfer the cost of medical care to the 
infant, her mother, and the hospital. While the States have an 
interest in preserving their limited funds, in this case the 
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f 
refusal of the Department of Health is unjustified• Federal 
regulations specifically fix residence at the site of physical 
presence where there is a dispute between states. Thus, the 
Department of Health is responsible for Shawnta's medical care. 
Further, When Norma Molina came to Utah, she came for an 
indefinite period. While she intended to return to Arizona, she 
knew neither when or to where she would return. While in Utah, 
she acted as a resident, making her home here, working and 
otherwise making it the center of her domestic, social and civil 
life. As such, she was a resident of Utah and entitled to the 
benefits of residency, including Medicaid benefits for her 
daughter. 
Therefore, this court should reverse the Order of the 
Department of Health and Order payment of Medicaid benefits on 
behalf of Shawnta Herrera for the months of December 1990 and 
January 1991. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this $0* day of November, 1992. 
KIRTON, McCONKIE & PpELMAN 
yffpp 
DaviQ B. Ek-icks^ h 
David J. HSrdy/ 
Attorneys for^Tetitioner 
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§ 435.322 42 CFR Ch. IV (10-1-91 Edition) 
cover the medically needy, it may pro-
vide Medicaid to Individuals who— 
(a) Are 65 years of age and older, as 
specified In 5 435.520; and 
(b) Meet the income and resource re-
quirements of Subpart I of this part. 
[46 PR 47986. Sept. 30, 1981) 
S 435.322 Medically needy coverage of the 
blind in States that cover individuals 
receiving SSI. 
If the agency provides Medicaid to 
Individuals receiving SSI and elects to 
;over the medically needy. It may pro-
/ide Medicaid to blind individuals who 
licet— 
(a) The requirements for blindness, 
is specified in §§435.530 and 435.531; 
tnd 
(b) The income and resource require-
nents of Subpart I of this part . 
46 FR 47986. Sept. 30. 1981J 
1435.321 Medically needy coverage of the 
disabled in States that cover individ-
uals receiving SSI. 
If the agency provides Medicaid to 
ndividuals receiving SSI and elects to 
over the medically needy, it may pro-
ide Medicaid to disabled individuals 
yho meet— 
(a) The requirements for disability, 
5 specified in §§435.540 and 435.541; 
nd 
(b) The income and resource require-
nents of Subpart I of this part . 
46 FR 47986. Sept. 30, 1981; 46 FR 54743, 
lov. 11. 19813 
435.326 Individuals who would be ineli-
gible if they were not enrolled in an 
HMO. 
If the agency provides Medicaid to 
he categorically needy under 
435.212. it may provide Medicaid 
tnder the same rules to medically 
icedy recipients who are enrolled in a 
ederally qualified HMO or in an 
ntity specified in §434.20 (a)(3) and 
a)(4). § 434.26(b)(3). § 434.26(b)(5)(H) 
>r section 1903(m)(6) of the Act which 
>rovides services as described in 
i 434.21(b) of this chapter. 
55 FR 23745. June 12. 1990] 
§ 435.330 Medically needy coverage of the 
aged, blind, and disabled in States that 
impose eligibility requirements more 
restrictive than used under SSI. 
(a) If an agency provides Medicaid as 
categorically needy only to those aged, 
blind, or disabled individuals who meet 
more restrictive requirements than 
used under SSI and elects to cover the 
medically needy, it may provide Med-
icaid as medically needy to those aged, 
blind, or disabled individuals who— 
(1) Are not categorically needy, as 
specified in paragraph (b) of this sec-
tion; 
(2) Have income and resources 
v/ithin the standards established 
under Subpart I of this part; and 
(3) If applying as blind or disabled, 
meet the blindness or disability re-
quirements established under 
§435.121. 
(b) To determine whether an individ-
ual Is covered as categorically needy or 
medically needy, the agency must— 
(1) Consider as categorically needy 
those individuals who meet the State 's 
categorically needy financial s tandard 
and— 
(1) Who, before their incurred medi-
cal expenses are deducted from 
income, meet the financial eligibility 
requirements for SSI or a State sup-
plement; or 
(ii) Whose OASDI increases are not 
counted under §§ 435.134 and 435.135. 
(2) Consider as medically needy all 
other individuals. 
(46 FR 47986. Sept. 30. 1981] 
§ 435.340 Protected medically needy cover-
age for blind and disabled individuals 
eligible in December 1973. 
If an agency provides Medicaid to 
the medically needy, It must cover in-
dividuals who— 
(a) Where eligible as medically 
needy under the Medicaid plan in De-
cember 1973 on the basis of the blind-
ness or disability criteria of the AB, 
APTD, or AABD plan; 
(b) For each consecutive month 
after December 1973, continue to 
meet— 
(1) Those blindness or disability cri-
teria; and 
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(2) The eligibility requirements for 
the medically needy under the Decem-
ber 1973 Medicaid plan; and 
(c) Meet the current requirements 
for eligibility as medically needy 
under the Medicaid plan except for 
blindness or disability criteria. 
(46 FR 47987. Sept. 30. 1981) 
8 135.402 | Reserved 1 
fl 435.403 State residence. 
§ 435.403 
§ 435.350 Coverage for certain aliens. 
If an agency provides Medicaid to 
the medically needy, it must provide 
the services necessary for the treat-
ment of an emergency medical condi-
tion, as defined in § 440.255(c) of this 
chapter, to those aliens described In 
§ 435.406(c) of this subpart . 
155 FR 36819. Sept. 7, 1990) 
Subpart E—General Eligibility 
Requirements 
fi 435.400 Scope. 
This subpart prescribes general re-
quirements for determining the eligi-
bility of both categorically and medi-
cally needy individuals specified in 
Subparts B, C, and D of this part. 
§ 435.401 (General rules. 
(a) A Medicaid agency may not 
impose any eligibility requirement 
that Is prohibited under Title XIX of 
the Act. 
(b) The agency must base any op-
tional group covered under Subparts B 
and C of this part on reasonable classi-
fications tha t do not result In arbi-
trary or inequitable t reatment of indi-
viduals and groups and tha t are con-
sistent with the objectives of Title 
XIX. 
(c) The agency must not use require-
ments for determining eligibility for 
optional coverage groups tha t are— 
(1) For families and children, more 
restrictive than those used under the 
State's AFDC plan; and 
(2) For aged, blind, and disabled in-
dividuals, more restrictive, than those 
used under SSI, except for Individuals 
receiving an optional State supple-
ment as specified in § 435.230 or indi-
viduals in categories specified by the 
agency under § 435.121. 
(a) Requirement. The agency must 
provide Medicaid to eligible residents* 
of the State, including residents who 
are absent from the State . T h e condi-
tions under which payment for serv-
ices is provided to out-of-State resi-
dents are set forth in § 431.52 of this 
chapter. 
(b) Definition. For purposes of this 
section—"Institution" has the same 
meaning as "Insti tution" and "Medical 
institution", as defined in § 435.1009 of 
this chapter. For purposes of Sta te 
placement, the term also includes 
"foster care homes", licensed as set 
forth in 45 CFR 1355.20, and providing 
food, shelter and supportive services 
to one or more persons unrelated to 
the proprietor. 
(c) Incapability of indicating intent. 
For purposes of this section, an indi-
vidual is considered incapable of indi-
cating intent if the individual— 
(1) Has an I.Q. of 49 or less or has a 
mental age of 7 or less, based on tests 
acceptable to the mental retardat ion 
agency in the State: 
(2) Is judged legally Incompetent; or 
(3) Is found incapable of indicating 
intent based on medical documenta-
tion obtained from a physician, psy-
chologist, or other person licensed by 
the State in the field of mental retar-
dation. 
(d) Who is a State resident. A resi-
dent of a State is any individual who: 
(1) Meets the conditions in para-
graphs (e) through (i) of this section; 
or 
(2) Meets the criteria specified in an 
interstate agreement under paragraph 
(k) of this section. 
(e) Placement by a State in an out-
of-State institution—(1) General rule. 
Any agency of the State, including an 
entity recognized under State law as 
being under .contract with the Sta te 
for such purposes^ that arranges for 
an individual to be placed in an insti-
tution located in another State, is rec-
ognized as acting on behalf of the 
State in making a placement. The 
State arranging or actually making 
the placement is considered as the In-
dividual's State of residence. 
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§ 435.403 42 CFR Ch. IV (10-1-91 Edition) 
(2) Any action beyond providing in-
formation to the individual and the in-
dividual's family would constitute ar-
ranging or making a State placement. 
However, the following actions do not 
constitute State placement: 
(i) Providing basic information to in-
dividuals about another State 's Medic-
aid program, and information about 
the availability of health care services 
and facilities in another State. 
(ii) Assisting an individual in locat-
ing an institution in another State, 
provided the individual is capable of 
indicating intent and independently 
decides to move. 
(3) When a competent individual 
leaves the facility In which the indi-
vidual is placed by a State , t ha t indi-
vidual's State of residence for Medic-
aid purposes is the State where the In-
dividual is physically located. 
(4) Where a placement is initiated by 
a State because the Sta te lacks a suffi-
cient number of appropriate facilities 
to provide services to its residents, the 
State making the placement is the in-
dividual's State of residence for Medic-
aid purposes. 
(f) Individuals receiving a State sup-
plementary payment iSSP). For indi-
viduals of any age who are receiving 
an SSP, the State of residence is the 
Sta te paying the SSP. 
(g) Individuals receiving Title IV-E 
payments. For individuals of any age 
who are receiving Federal payments 
for foster care and adoption assistance 
under title IV-E of the Social Security 
Act, the State of residence is the Sta te 
where the child lives. 
(h) Individuals under Age 21. (1) For 
any individual who is emancipated 
from his or her parents or who is mar-
* ried and capable of indicating intent, 
the State of residence is the Sta te 
where the individual is living with the 
intention to remain there permanently 
or for an indefinite period. 
p (2) For any individual not residing in 
an institution as defined in paragraph 
)Q(b) whose Medicaid eligibility is based 
on blindness or disability, the Sta te of 
residence is the State in which the in-
dividual is living. 
<3) For any other non-institutional-
* jzed individual not subject to para-
^f^graph (h)(1) or (h)(2) of this section; 
the State of residence is determined in-
accordance with 45 CFR 233.40, the 
rules governing residence under the 
AFDC program! 
(4) For any institutionalized individ-
ual who is neither married nor emanci-
pated, the Sta te of residence Is— 
(i) The parent 's or legal guardian's -
Sta te of residence "at the time of place-
ment (if a legal guardian has been ap-
pointed and parental rights are termi-
nated, the Sta te of residence of the 
guardian is used instead of the par-
ent's); or 
(ii) T h e current S ta te of residence of 
the parent or legal guardian who files 
the application if the individual is in-
stitutionalized in t ha t S ta te (if a legal 
guardian has been appointed and pa-
rental rights are terminated, the Sta te 
or residence of the guardian is used in-
stead of the parent 's) . 
(iii) T h e State of residence of the in-
dividual or party who files an applica-
tion is used if the individual has been 
abandoned by his or her parent(s), 
does not have a legal guardian and is 
institutionalized in t ha t State . 
(i) Individuals Age 21 and over. (1) 
For any individual not residing in an 
institution as defined in paragraph (b), 
the State of residence is the Sta te 
where the individual is— 
(i) Living with the intention to 
remain there permanently or for an 
indefinite period (or If incapable of 
stating intent, where the individual is 
living); or 
(ii) Living and which the individual 
entered with a job commitment or 
seeking employment (whether or not 
currently employed). 
(2) For any institutionalized individ-
ual who became incapable of indicat-
ing intent before age 21, the Sta te of 
residence is— 
(i) T h a t of the parent applying for 
Medicaid on the individual's behalf, if 
the parents reside in separate States 
(if a legal guardian has been appointed 
and parental rights are terminated, 
the Sta te of residence of the guardian 
is used instead of the parent 's); 
(ii) The parent 's or legal guardian's 
Sta te of residence at the time of place-
ment (If a legal guardian has been ap-
pointed and parental rights are termi-
nated, the Sta te of residence of the 
guardian is used instead of the par-
ent's); or 
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(iii) The current S ta te of residence 
of the parent or legal guardian who 
files the application if the individual is 
institutionalized in tha t Sta te (If a 
legal guardian has been appointed and 
parental rights are terminated, the 
State of residence of the guardian is 
used instead of the parent 's) . 
(iv) The Sta te of residence of the in-
dividual or party who files an applica-
tion is used if the individual has been 
abandoned by his or her parent(s), 
does not have a legal guardian and is 
institutionalized in tha t State . 
(3) For any institutionalized individ-
ual who became incapable of indicat-
ing Intent at or after age 21, the Sta te 
of residence is the Sta te in which the 
Individual is physically present, except 
where another Sta te makes a place-
ment. 
(4) For any o ther institutionalized 
individual, the Sta te of residence is 
the State where the Individual is living 
with the intention to remain there 
permanently or for an indefinite 
period. 
(j) Specific prohibitions. (1) The 
agency may not deny Medicaid eligibil-
ity because an individual has not re-
sided in the S ta te for a specified 
period. 
(2) The agency may not deny Medic-
aid eligibility to an individual In an in-
stitution, who satisfies the residency 
rules set forth in this section, on the 
grounds tha t the individual did not es-
tablish residence in the S ta te before 
entering the institution. 
(3) The agency may not deny or ter-
minate a resident's Medicaid eligibility 
because of tha t person's temporary ab-
sence from the Sta te if the person In-
tends to return when the purpose of 
the absence has been accomplished, 
unless another Sta te has determined 
that the person is a resident there for 
purposes of Medicaid. 
(k) Interstate agreements. A State 
may have a written agreement with 
another Sta te setting forth rules and 
procedures resolving cases of disputed 
residency. These agreements may es-
tablish criteria other than those speci-
fied in paragraphs (c) tftvough (i) of 
this section, but must not include cri-
teria tha t result in loss of residency in 
both States or tha t are prohibited by 
paragraph (j) of this section. The 
§ 435.406 
agreements must contain a procedure 
for providing Medicaid to individuals 
pending resolution of the case. States 
may use interstate agreeements for 
purposes other than cases of disputed 
residency to facilitate administration 
of the program, and to facilitate the 
placement and adoption of title IV-E 
individuals when the child and his or 
her adoptive parent(s) move into an-
other State. 
(1) Continued Medicaid for institu-
tionalized recipients. If an agency is 
providing Medicaid to an institutional-
ized recipient who, as a result of this 
section, would be considered a resident 
of a different State— 
(1) The agency must continue to 
provide Medicaid to tha t recipient 
from June 24, 1983 until July 5. 1984, 
unless it makes arrangements with an-
other State of residence to provide 
Medicaid at an earlier date: and 
(2) Those arrangements must not in-
clude provisions prohibited by para-
graph (h) of this section. 
(m) Cases of disputed residency. 
Where two or more States cannot re-
solve which State is the S ta te of resi-
dence, the State where the Individual' 
Is physically located is the S ta te of 
residence. * 
[49 FR 13531. Apr. 5. 1984. as amended at 55 
PR 48609. Nov. 21. 19901 
§ 435.404 Applicant's choice of category. 
The agency must allow an individual 
who would be eligible under more 
than one category to have his eligibil-
ity determined for the category he se-
lects. 
6 435.106 Citizenship and alienage. 
(a) The agency must provide Medic-
aid to otherwise eligible residents of 
the United States who are— 
(1) Citizens; or 
(2) Aliens lawfully admitted for per-
manent residence or permanently re-
siding in the United States under color 
of law as defined in § 435.408 of this 
part; 
(3) Aliens granted lawful temporary 
resident status under sections 245A 
and 210A of the Immigration and Na-
tionality Act if the individual is aged, 
blind, or disabled as defined in section 
1614(a)(1) of the Act, under 18 years 
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GLOSSARY 
Resident (Utah Resident) 
Retroactive Month 
An individual who lives in Utah permanently or 
indefinitely. Ususally, people who own homes in 
other states are not Utah residents because their 
primary place of residence is somewhere else. If a 
client who owns a home in another state claims 
NOT to be in Utah for a temporary purpose, that 
client may be a Utah Resident if he intends to 
become a Utahn. ©tents^whc^arr^mployed^fn 
anotheristate^are,usually.not.Utah,jesidents unless, 
theyxommute regularly? 
Any of the three months immediately preceding 
the initial month. 
Safeguard To protect information about clients so that 
unauthorized people may not see it. 
Sales Contract 
SAVE 
SAWs 
A method of selling property, usually real estate. 
The seller exchanges the property for a contractual 
promise of a certain amount of money at specific 
times. The sales contract is an asset that may or 
may not be exempt. 
Systematic Alien Verification for Entitlements. 
This is a computerized information exchange 
system that gives us information from INS to verify 
citizenship status. 
Special Agricultural Workers. A group of aliens 
who may be eligible for legal temporary status or 
legal permanent status (amnesty) under the 
Immigration Reform and Control Act. 
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TABLE VIII - EXAMPLES OF ACCEPTABLE VERIFICATIONS 
Verification: The act of establishing the validity and accuracy of information 
received in the process of determining eligibility of each 
applicant or recipient. 
This table provides EXAMPLES of acceptable verifications. The worker may use 
any other reasonable method of verification as long as it provides the necessary 
information to determine eligibility. 
ELIGIBILITY ITEM ACCEPTABLE VERIFICATION 
U.S. RESIDENCE: AGE 
IDENTIFICATION 
SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER 
UTAH RESIDENCE 
INCOME 
Earned 
Earned Income Deductions 
Free Housing Provided 
Foster Care Payments 
(1) Birth Certificate (2) Hospital Birth Record 
(3) Church Records (4) Recipient of Scoial Secruity 
Benefits (5) FSA Form 125 (6) Alien Registration (7) 
Naturalization Papers (8) Correspondence.from 
Immigration and Naturalization service (9) Tribal 
Records (10) Census Record (11) Driver's License for 
I.D. only. 
(1) Social Security Card (2) SSA form 5028 
(1) Current Utah DL (2) Employment payroll check 
stubs (3) Current USES registration (4) House 
payment receipt (5) Current rent receipt showing 30 
days or more (6) Utah telephone book listing 
(referenced) (7) Tribal Record correspondence (8) 
Children's residence usually follows that of parents 
(9) MAO-patient in nursing home (30) Statement pU 
-intent to remain;** Utah* 
(1) Employment payroll check stubs (2) Employer's 
wage record (3) Self-employment records (4) Tribal 
records correspondence (5) Copy of most recent 
1040 
(1) Check stubs showing payroll deductions or a 
signed statement from employer (2) Complete 
expense record for the self-employed (3) Farmer's 
Home Administration Statement if self-employed 
farmer. 
(1) Employer's records (2) Written agreement 
(1) Agency records 
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